Th�nen and the New Economic Geography

In this paper, I explain Th�nen's pioneering work on industrial agglomeration. In my opinion, Th�nen's thinking on industrial agglomeration was not only amazingly advanced for his time, but in many respects remains novel even today. It is shown that if we unify Th�nen's well-known theory on agricultural land use with this pioneering work on industrial agglomeration by using modern tools, then we essentially come up with a prototype of New Economic Geography model.

The Dynamics of Knowledge Diversity and Economic Growth

How is long run economic growth related to the endogenous diversity of knowledge? We formulate and study a microeconomic model of knowledge creation, through the interactions among a group of heterogeneous R & D workers, embedded in a growth model to address this question. In contrast with the traditional literature, in our model the composition of the research work force in terms of knowledge heterogeneity matters, in addition to its size, in determining the production of new knowledge. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the work force is endogenous. Income to these workers accrues as patent income, whereas transmission of newly created knowledge to all such workers occurs due to public transmission of patent information. Knowledge in common is required for communication, but differential knowledge is useful to bring originality to the endeavor. Whether or not the system reaches the most productive state depends on the strength of the public knowledge transmission technology. Equilibrium paths are found analytically. Long run economic growth is positively related to both the effectiveness of pairwise R & D worker interaction and to the effectiveness of public knowledge transmission.knowledge creation; knowledge externalities; microfoundations of endogenous growth; knowledge diversity and growth

Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube

This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation and transfer in a small group of people. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation affects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. In the two person case, we show that the equilibrium process tends to result in the accumulation of too much knowledge in common compared to the most productive state. Unlike the two-person case, in the four person case we show that the equilibrium process of knowledge creation may converge to the most productive state. Equilibrium paths are found analytically, and they are a discontinuous function of initial heterogeneity.knowledge creation, knowledge transfer, knowledge externalities, microfoundations of endogenous growth

Culture and diversity in knowledge creation

Is the paradise of effortless communication the ideal environment for knowledge creation? Or, can the development of local culture in regions raise knowledge productivity compared to a single region with a unitary culture? In other words, can a real technological increase in the cost of collaboration and the cost of public knowledge flow between regions, resulting in cultural differentiation between regions, increase welfare? In our framework, a culture is a set of ideas held exclusively by residents of a location. In general in our model, the equilibrium path generates separate cultures in different regions. When we compare this to the situation where all workers are resident in one region, R & D workers become too homogeneous and there is only one culture. As a result, equilibrium productivity in the creation of new knowledge is lower relative to the situation when there are multiple cultures and workers are more diverse.knowledge creation; knowledge diversity; ideas and culture

Dynamics of knowledge creation and transfer: The two person case

This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation and transfer for a couple. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation affects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features myopic agents in a pure externality model of interaction. In the two person case, we show that the equilibrium process tends to result in the accumulation of too much knowledge in common compared to the most productive state. Equilibrium paths are found analytically, and they are a discontinuous function of initial heterogeneity.knowledge creation; knowledge transfer; knowledge externalities; endogenous agent heterogeneity

Culture and diversity in knowledge creation

Is the paradise of effortless communication the ideal environment for knowledge creation? Or, can the development of local culture in regions raise knowledge productivity compared to a single region with a unitary culture? In other words, can a real technological increase in the cost of collaboration and the cost of public knowledge flow between regions, resulting in cultural differentiation between regions, increase welfare? In our framework, a culture is a set of ideas held exclusively by residents of a location. In general in our model, the equilibrium path generates separate cultures in different regions. When we compare this to the situation where all workers are resident in one region, R & D workers become too homogeneous and there is only one culture. As a result, equilibrium productivity in the creation of new knowledge is lower relative to the situation when there are multiple cultures and workers are more diverse.knowledge creation; knowledge diversity; ideas and culture

Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from “the rest of the world”. The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quotas. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries’ choices. It turns out that a county with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonised immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries.Immigration quotas, Heterogeneity, Production complementarity, Welfare, Policy Harmonisation

Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube

This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation through the interactions among a group of people. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation affects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features myopic agents in a pure externality model of interaction. Surprisingly, in the general case for a large set of initial conditions we find that the equilibrium process of knowledge creation converges to the most productive state, where the population splits into smaller groups of optimal size; close interaction takes place within each group only. This optimal size is larger as the heterogeneity of knowledge is more important in the knowledge production process. Equilibrium paths are found analytically, and they are a discontinuous function of initial heterogeneity.knowledge creation, knowledge externalities, microfoundations of endogenous growth

The dynamics of knowledge diversity and economic growth

How is long run economic growth related to the endogenous diversity of knowledge? We formulate and study a microeconomic model of knowledge creation, through the interactions among a group of heterogeneous R & D workers, embedded in a growth model to address this question. In contrast with the traditional literature, in our model the composition of the research work force in terms of knowledge heterogeneity matters, in addition to its size, in determining the production of new knowledge. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the work force is endogenous. Income to these workers accrues as patent income, whereas transmission of newly created knowledge to all such workers occurs due to public transmission of patent information. Knowledge in common is required for communication, but differential knowledge is useful to bring originality to the endeavor. Whether or not the system reaches the most productive state depends on the strength of the public knowledge transmission technology. Equilibrium paths are found analytically. Long run economic growth is positively related to both the effectiveness of pairwise R & D worker interaction and to the effectiveness of public knowledge transmission.knowledge creation; knowledge externalities; microfoundations of endogenous growth; knowledge diversity and growth

Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube

This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation and transfer in a small group of people. It is intended to contribute eventually to the development of microfoundations for aggregate models of knowledge externalities used in various literatures, such as those pertaining to endogenous growth theory, urban agglomeration and growth, organizational R&D and knowledge creation, and human capital accumulation. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation affects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. In the two person case, we show that the equilibrium process tends to result in the accumulation of too much knowledge in common compared to the most productive state. Unlike the two-person case, in the four person case we show that under certain conditions, the equilibrium process of knowledge creation by four persons may converge to the most productive state. Extensions of the basic model are discussedknowledge creation, knowledge transfer, knowledge externalities, microfoundations of endogenous growth